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————————————Abstract———————————————— 
 
Payment transactions initiated through a mobile device are growing and security concerns must be ad-
dressed. People coming from payment card industry often talk passionately about porting ISO 9564 PIN 
standard based authentication in open-loop card payment to closed-loop mobile financial transactions 
and certification of closed-loop payment product or solution against this standard. In reality, so far this 
standard has not been adopted in closed-loop mobile payment authentication and applicability of this ISO 
standard must be studied carefully before adoption. The authors do a critical analysis of the applicability 
of this ISO specification and makes categorical statement about relevance of compliance to closed-loop 
mobile payment. Security requirements for authentication in closed-loop mobile payment systems are not 
standardised through ISO 9564 standard, Common Criteria [3], etc. Since closed-loop mobile payment is 
a relatively new field, the authors make a case for Common Criteria Recognition Agreement (CCRA) or 
other standards organization to push for publication of a mobile device-agnostic Protection Profile or 
standard for it, incorporating the suggested authentication approaches.  
 
Keywords: ISO 9564 PIN Based Authentication, Card-Present and Card-Not-Present Transactions, 
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tection Profile, Device Fingerprinting, m-PIN (mobile PIN), One Time Password (OTP), Android Applica-
tion component called Service, backend service.  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Financial inclusion in developing economies has been possible with emergence of mobile closed-loop 
stored-value-account based payment system that provides an alternative to standard banking system. In 
African and Asian countries and also in other emerging economies, closed-loop payment systems have 
established significant footprint. M-PESA [23] in Africa has been a huge success.  
 
Open-loop payment networks such as Visa, MasterCard connect multiple parties —cardholder, financial 
institution that issues payment cards, a.k.a. issuer, the merchant and the one that has banking relation-
ship with the merchants, a.k.a. acquirer— and manages flow of financial data and processing among 
them. Closed-loop payment network operator provides payment services directly to merchants and card-
holders, without involving third-party financial institution as intermediary. 
Mobile closed-loop payment applications enable consumers to manage and usestored-value account 
(SVA) and digital wallet, through their mobile device. This is used, for making payment, using backend 
services and also using POS terminals in some cases. Various communication channels like USSD, 
SMS, HTTP(S), etc may be used between application or component on mobile device and the backend 
services. A basic closed-loop mobile payment system may be functionally described as a hierarchical 
money distribution and payment system involving agents and whole-sale distributor and also mobile sub-
scribers, with an accounting system that supports stored-value (SVA), i.e., prepaid system. USSD and 
SMS are often used as channels and a basic or feature phone is sufficient. As a result, authentication 
needed for initiation of closed-loop transactions by subscribers is often based on mobile PIN (m-PIN).  
 
For online purchase using laptops, desktops and smartphones, device identification [6, 13] techniques 
have been used as additional authentication mechanism. Hristo Bojinov et al[16] demonstrated how the 
multitude of sensors on a smartphone can be used to construct a reliable hardware fingerprint of the 
phone and how such a fingerprint can be used to de-anonymise mobile devices as they connect to web 
sites, and as a second factor in identifying legitimate users to a remote server. Michael Rausch et al [18] 
observed cookies are the dominant technology for tracking user on the internet, some companies have 
developed an alternative form of tracking known as device fingerprinting that does not rely on cookies to 
identify a visitor. In this method, a profile of the user may be created by querying the browser through Ja-
vaScript about characteristics such as browser version, screen size, fonts installed and more [17, 18, 19]. 
 
It is assumed that we do not want to couple the solution of hardening the mobile PIN (m-PIN) with the 
SIM (UICC) or other forms of Secure Element [24] provided by the telecom operator and m-PIN may be 
used for various access bearers like USSD, SMS, NFC (near field communication) and mobile handset 
apps. Mobile devices have been used for authentication in web payment since many years [14, 15] and 
general concept of authentication in the context of mobile is well established.  
 
In this paper, the focus is on applicability of ISO 9564 PIN based authentication to specific type of closed-
loop payment system where payment is initiated from an application running on device operating system 
and where the owner of the closed-loop payment system is typically a mobile network operator or a bank.  
 
 
II. LITERATURE SURVEY  
 
A. Review of ISO 9564 [1,2] Card PIN Management in Open-Loop Card Pay-
ment Authentication 
I. In ISO 9564, card PINs are protected by a secure PIN block, to prevent diction-
ary attacks.  
II. To protect the PIN during transmission from the secure PIN entry device (e.g., a 
component in the POS terminal) to the verifier, the standard requires that the 
PIN be encrypted, and specifies several formats that may be used. In each 
case, the PIN is encoded into a 64-bit PIN block, which is then encrypted by an 
algorithm approved by the specification.  
III. For online interchange transactions, PINs must be protected by encryption using 
ISO 9564–1 PIN-block formats 0, 1, or 3 and also using physical security fea-
tures of secure PIN entry devices. Format 3 is recommended.  
a. For ISO format 0 and 3, the clear-text PIN block and the Primary Account 
Number (PAN) block must be XOR'ed together and then Triple-DES en-
crypted in electronic code book (ECB) mode to form the 64-bit output ci-
pher block (the reversible encrypted PIN block).  
b. ISO format 1 and format 2 are formed by concatenation of two fields: the 
plain-text PIN field and the filler field.  
c. The PIN entry device shall include tamper-detection and response mech-
anisms which, if attacked, cause the PIN Entry Device (PED) [10]  to be-
come immediately inoperable and result in the automatic and immediate 
erasure of any secret information that might have been stored in the 
PED, such that it becomes infeasible to recover the secret information. 
The PIN entry device should be able to authenticate itself to the acquirer 
such that, once compromised, it is no longer able to authenticate itself to 
the acquirer. 
IV. ISO 9564 PIN block format 2 must be used for encrypting card PINs that are 
submitted from the IC card reader to the IC card (a fact known as offline authen-
tication).  
V. All cardholder PINs processed offline using Integrated Circuit (IC) card technol-
ogy must be protected in accordance with the requirements in Book 2 of the 
EMV IC Card Specifications for Payment Systems and ISO 9564. 
VI. The provisions of ISO 9564-1:2011 are not intended to cover PIN management 
and security in environments where no persistent cryptographic relationship ex-
ists between the transaction-origination device and the acquirer, e.g., use of a 
browser for payment in online shopping.  
VII. Persistent cryptographic relationship of the type mentioned above may be estab-
lished by sharing a secret, e.g., symmetric encryption key between transaction 
originating secure cryptographic device (component in ATM, POS terminals, etc) 
and the acquirer processor.   
VIII. Secure cryptographic devices used in ISO 9564 compliant systems are typically 
FIPS 140-2 Level 3 and EMVCo Level1 and Level2 [10, 11, 12]  certified. Most 
mobile devices in the market are not FIPS 140-2 certified and high-end mobile 
devices in the market which are a very small fraction of overall mobile devices in 
circulation are certified at FIPS 140-2 Level 1 only.  
 
 
 
B. QR Code for Closed-Loop Payment  
 
Camera of mobile device of the customer, along with software, may scan payment infor-
mation provided by merchant in the form of QR Code and make payment. In case of 
closed-loop payment, an application on mobile device would authenticate the mobile de-
vice and/or the customer with the backend service. Authentication may be based on m-PIN 
and optionally some form of device identity or device fingerprinting [6, 16]. Advantage is 
that most phones can scan QR code, but number of phone with NFC capability is still a 
small fraction. 
 
 
C. Closed-Loop NFC Payment, Android HCE [9] and EMVCo Specifica-
tion [4] 
 
NFC channel has also been used in closed-loop payment where an application on mobile 
device operating system or secure element (SE) (e.g., SIM card, embedded SE, etc) on 
an NFC-enabled device used by the customer, creates cryptogram to interact with NFC-
enabled closed-loop POS-terminal. This process directly debits fund from the stored val-
ue account of the account holder. Here too, authentication is needed and often it is in the 
form of an m-PIN that is typically entered on the NFC-enabled mobile device of the cus-
tomer and is sent to the backend service of the closed-loop payment system through the 
application on the customer’s device. This is one variant of closed-loop NFC payment. 
Some implementation used SIM card of the mobile device as Secure Element and the m-
PIN entered by the customer may be validated offline in Secure Element and the PIN is 
often used for authorising cryptographic operation inside the Secure Element.  
 
In NFC card emulation mode [7], a mobile device can emulate contactless smart 
card(such as those used for contactless payments, transit fare payment and building, etc) 
when tapped on a contactless reader or point-of-sale (POS) terminal. Until recently, the 
emulated contactless card application has been stored in a secure element (SE) [7, 8], 
defined by Global Platform as a tamper-resistant smart card capable of securely hosting 
applications and their confidential and cryptographic data. With introduction of host card 
emulation (HCE) [9],it is now possible to store the emulated contactless card application 
as a service running locally on the mobile device operating system (Service is a type of 
Application Component as per Android application framework [20] ). Google’s Android 
OS (v4.4 “KitKat”onwards) and the Blackberry OS support this.NFC controller in mobile 
device can route communication from the contactless reader or POS terminal to an HCE 
service on the mobile device.  
With HCE, the service running on the mobile host operating system can interface with a 
contactless reader or POS terminal via NFC. This HCE service can be part of a mobile 
application with a user interface, such as a mobile wallet for payment. HCE can be used 
to support both closed-loop and open-loop payments. In case of open-loop NFC with 
HCE, it should be noted that NFC application would run on the mobile device OS rather 
than SE.  
 
For open-loop NFC payment with HCE, the new EMVCo specification compliant tokens 
[4], typically made valid for limited period or number of use through configuration, is used 
by this HCE service for payment [4]. The tokens can be stored in the application itself or 
they could be stored in other secure locations such as a trusted execution environment 
(TEE) [21] or a Secure Element(SE) or alternatively, the HCE service could connect in 
real-time or at given intervals with a back-end server in the cloud to retrieve payment to-
ken to exchange with the contactless terminal. Since TEE and SE limited adoption of 
NFC until now, until introduction of HCE, NFC payment did not gain significant momen-
tum so far. Real-time retrieval of tokens from the cloud at the moment of tapping on a 
reader or POS terminal is a possible but unlikely option, as network latency may result in 
a poor user experience. Limited validity payment token specified by EMVCo in 2014 [4], 
would be used in place of a physical payment card for generation and/or processing of 
EMV payment cryptogram. Visa, Mastercard, and Europay, together known as EMVCo, 
published a new specification for Payment Tokenisation in Q1, 2014. Tokenisation is a 
way of not exposing the permanent account number (PAN) of the cardholder.  NFC pay-
ment is perhaps the principal driver of the new EMVCo tokenisation specification.  
Here are some salient features of the new EMVCo payment tokenisation specification:   
• The specification requires the token format to be similar to credit card numbers 
(13-19 digits) and comply with LUHN algorithm. 
• Unlike financial tokens used today and which follow PCI guidelines for non-
payment token used for analytics/reporting, the new specification compliant token 
can be used to initiate payments. 
• The new specification compliant tokens are merchant or payment network specif-
ic, so they are only relevant to a specific domain. 
• For most use cases, the PAN remains private between issuer and customer. The 
token becomes a payment object shared between merchants, payment proces-
sors, the customer, and possibly others within the domain. 
• There is an identity verification, i.e., authentication, process to validate the re-
questor of a token each time a token is requested. 
• The type of token generated is variable and is based on risk score. 
• When tokens are used as a payment objects, there are “Data Elements” which in-
clude payment network data, cryptographic nonce and token assurance level. 
• There are facilities and features to address PAN privacy, mobile payments, re-
payments, EMV/smartcard, and even card-not-present web transactions. 
 
 
D. Review of Apple Pay and Tokenisation [5]  
 
In October, 2014, with iPhone 6, Apple introduced secure contactless or NFC payment [5]. 
With Apple Pay, during registration, user adds actual credit and debit card numbers to 
backend called Passbook and a unique Device Account Number is assigned, encrypted, 
and securely stored in the Secure Element, a dedicated chip in iPhone. These numbers 
are not stored on Apple servers. And when the user makes a purchase, the De-
vice Account Number, along with a transaction-specific dynamic, one-time-use security 
code called token, is used to process payment. Actual credit or debit card numbers are 
never shared by Apple with merchants or acquirers, or transmitted over the network. As for 
tokenisation in Apple Pay, tokenisation and de-tokenisation operations take place at card 
networks like Visa and American Express and not at processor or payment gateway. Alt-
hough compliance of this tokenisation with new EMVCo tokenisation [4] is not in public 
domain, the authors believe that at least conceptually, these approaches are similar.  
 
 
III. CURRENT WORK - ANALYSIS OF APPLICABILITY OF ISO 9564 PIN AUTHEN-
TICATION TO CLOSED-LOOP MOBILE PAYMENT SYSTEM 
 
A. ASSUMPTIONS 
It is assumed that we do not want to couple the solution of securing the mobile payment authenti-
cation with the SIM (UICC) and other form factors of Secure Element [24] provided by the telecom 
operator or other parties.Furthermore, m-PIN for authentication may be used for various access 
bearers or channels like USSD, SMS, NFC (near field communication) and mobile handset apps 
(using HTTP(S) channel). Additional mechanisms may also be applied to secure the authentica-
tion even further.   
B. ANALYSIS 
Even for open-loop NFC payment, authentication of cardholder with the help of token by the card 
issuer need not comply with ISO 9564 PIN standard at all and there is no strong case of suprem-
acy of this ISO specification in case of mobile payment in general. Therefore, we focus our atten-
tion to closed-loop payment. Let us analyse two distinct scenarios.  
 
 I. Can ISO 9564 PIN Management be extended to Closed-Loop Mobile Payment Au-
thentication in Mobile-Device-Present Transaction? 
 
m-PIN is entered on the user-owned mobile device for mobile-device-present transaction 
for in-store purchase. The merchant has an SVA in the same closed-loop system as the 
subscriber. The application on mobile device cannot establish truly secure cryptographic 
relationship with the acquirer (i.e., the backend services in case of closed-loop system) to 
enable PIN block encryption for online or real-time authentication which involves verifica-
tion by the issuer (i.e., the backend services in case of closed-loop system)  of m-PIN. 
Therefore it is not a good idea to think about complying with ISO 9654 for this type of use 
of m-PIN. Most end-user mobile devices in circulation in the market would not even pass 
FIPS 140-2 Level 1 certification and question of storing sensitive data securely in mobile 
devices does not arise.  
 
  
II. Can ISO 9564 PIN Management be extended to Closed-Loop Payment Authentica-
tion involving merchant POS terminal or Bank ATM Machine, i.e., Mobile-Device-Not-
Present Transaction? 
 
a. Because of challenge in inter-operability, only ISO 9564 PIN block format-1 may be con-
sidered (plain text m-PIN plus some filler) for online m-PIN verification by the SVA sys-
tem acting as SVA issuer, for purchase on merchant web site. Of course, encrypted 
communication channel (SSL/TLS) may be used, but message or data level encryption 
of PIN block is not possible. If we have to consider other formats, MSISDN (Mobile Sta-
tion International Subscriber Directory Number or mobile number) may be used as a 
substitute for PAN (permanent account number in case of card) and this along with m-
PIN may be used for formation of block.  
b. Closed-loop m-PIN would be exposed to the intermediaries of interfacing open-loop sys-
tem (e.g., merchant POS terminal or ATM machine of the bank) because of plaintext da-
ta. Because encrypted communication channel must terminate at intermediary.  
c. In card based system, PIN is used only for card-present transaction and never for card-
not-present transaction. Card-not-present transaction (e.g., online shopping) uses CVV 
or equivalent and 3D Secure technology specified by networks or some form of OTP 
(one-time-password).  Somebody using closed-loop SVA for in-store shopping and using 
merchant’s POS terminal would not require using the mobile device (which provides a 
level of authentication –something the user has). This is equivalent to online mobile 
payment or mobile-device-not-present payment and use of m-PIN only for authentication 
for such use case, is not a good idea.   
d. Therefore it is not a good idea to think of compliance with ISO 9654 for this type of use of 
m-PIN.  
 
 
C. FUTURE DIRECTION OF CLOSED-LOOP MOBILE PAYMENT AUTHENTICATION  
 
In closed-loop payment system, the issuer of stored-value-account (SVA) is typically a telecom 
operator and in some cases, a bank. The acquirer of transaction where SVA is used as a payment 
instrument for a purchase on a merchant site or in store, is a POS terminal or ATM machine or a 
payment gateway of web site. Specific customer authentication requirements for such systems are 
not standardised.  
 
On the other hand, open-loop card-based payment uses card PIN for card-present payment au-
thentication and this is based on ISO 9564 standard. Visa and Mastercard based open-loop pay-
ment schemes or networks with associated issuers, acquirers, merchants and cardholders are 
very well known.  
 
Most mobile devices in circulation in the market would not even pass FIPS 140-2 Level 1 certifica-
tion and question of storing sensitive data securely in mobile devices does not arise. Although 
Trusted Computing Group [22] (TCG)’s Mobile Trusted Computing (MTM) [22] or GlobalPlatform’s 
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) [21] are approaches for making mobile devices more se-
cure, adoption of such specification in the market is insignificant.  
 
Besides m-PIN, out-of-band or in-band OTP, device fingerprinting, etc may be used to strengthen 
authentication in closed-loop mobile payment. There is no chance that people would talk about 
applying ISO 9564 standard to this use case.   
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Card professionals who are coming to the domain of mobile payments often try to apply ISO 9564 card 
PIN authentication to mobile payment and even go to the extent of complying with this standard for 
closed-loop mobile payment. The authors highlighted that such compliance is misplaced. Instead of such 
compliance, we must use standard channel level encryption for direct transmission of m-PIN between 
mobile device and the remote closed-loop payment service and other mechanisms for stronger authenti-
cation. Question of applicability of ISO 9564 is often raised by card professionals in mobile payments do-
main and this has not been addressed by anybody so far in the payment security industry, as per 
knowledge of the authors. The authors make categorical statement about applicability of this ISO stand-
ard and hope that this analysis would help both card professionals coming to mobile payments and also 
existing mobile payment professionals to take informed decision regarding security and compliance.  
 
Since closed-loop mobile payment is a relatively new field, the authors make a case for Common Criteria 
Recognition Agreement (CCRA) [3] or other standards body to push for publication of a mobile device-
agnostic Protection Profile or specific standard, respectively, incorporating the suggested high-level re-
quirements (e.g., m-PIN, OTP, device fingerprinting, etc).  
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